

FOUL BALL: MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL'S CBA EXPLOITS COLLEGE SENIORS IN THE MLB DRAFT

By

Jonathan C. Gordon*

ABSTRACT

Every year, in Major League Baseball's Amateur Player Draft, college seniors routinely receive signing bonuses well below the amount that the league recommends for them. This paper focuses on Major League Baseball's most recent collective-bargaining agreement and its impact on the MLB Draft. Specifically, this paper explains how the CBA has wrongly affected college seniors. The paper concludes with a proposal that would guarantee drafted college seniors a signing bonus of at least a certain monetary amount. This solution would fix the problem at hand, protect college seniors, and encourage more college players to finish with their degrees.

I. INTRODUCTION

Trevor Frank played baseball for the University of California, Riverside.¹ The college senior, a right-handed pitcher, was selected in the eighth round (231st player overall) by the Cleveland Indians in the 2013 Major League Baseball (MLB) Draft.² Based on this slot in the draft, Frank's recommended signing bonus (as determined by the commissioner of Major League Baseball) was \$158,300.³ Frank signed for a bonus of \$10,000, roughly 6% of what was recommended.⁴

Prior to each draft, the MLB commissioner establishes recommended signing bonuses for each pick in the first ten rounds of the MLB Draft.⁵ For the 2013 Draft, these recommended bonuses started at \$7.79 million for the first pick and diminished to \$135,500 for the last of the tenth round picks.⁶ The recommended amount for each pick is more commonly called "slot money." Players who receive more than the recommended amount are said to have signed "above slot," while players who receive less than the recommended amount are said to have signed "below slot." Those who sign for the actual recommended amount are said to have signed "at slot."

Many players receive bonuses less than the recommended amount.⁷ Some players are simply willing to take less money immediately so they can begin playing sooner.⁸ Others are represented by agents who are less skilled in negotiations and unable to negotiate higher bonuses.⁹ In either case, many of these players still receive a fairly respectable bonus—somewhat *near* the recommended amount.¹⁰ College seniors, as a group, however, do not fare so well. College seniors drafted in the first ten rounds of 2013 MLB Draft received an average bonus more than 80% less than the recommended amount.¹¹ Fifty-seven college seniors were drafted – and signed – in the first ten rounds of the 2013 MLB Draft. Fifty-five of them received bonuses less than the recommended amount.¹² Why?

While Major League Baseball's collective-bargaining agreement does not directly punish college seniors, it fails to protect them.¹³ Trevor Frank is just one example of drafted college

* Student, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN

seniors who are unfairly and wrongly impacted by Major League Baseball's collective-bargaining agreement (CBA).¹⁴ In Parts II and III, this paper will describe Major League Baseball's collective-bargaining agreement and examine the effects of the recent 2011 CBA. Part IV analyzes the concept of fair compensation. Finally, in Part V, this paper proposes a solution that would protect college seniors drafted in the MLB Draft.

II. MLB COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING AGREEMENT (CBA)

A. History of CBA

The MLB collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) governs the terms and conditions of employment between the MLB owners and the Major League Players Association (MLBPA).¹⁵ The MLBPA is responsible for protecting professional MLB players and negotiating labor agreements on their behalf.¹⁶ The MLBPA is not, however, legally responsible for protecting minor league players or potential draftees (such as high school or college players).¹⁷ The MLBPA legally only represents "players...who hold a signed contract with a Major League club."¹⁸ However, the MLBPA has taken it upon itself to generally protect minor leaguers and potential draftees and their interests.¹⁹

Major League Baseball's first collective-bargaining agreement was negotiated in 1968 by MLB players with the help of Marvin Miller, a prominent economist focused on establishing a labor union for the players.²⁰ Miller would serve as the executive director of the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) from 1966-1983.²¹ During his tenure, Miller negotiated salary minimums, arbitration clauses, pension funds, licensing rights, and much more²²—all of which changed the game of baseball forever.²³

Since its inception in 1871, Major League Baseball has never operated with a salary cap (unlike the National Basketball Association (NBA), National Hockey League (NHL), and National Football League (NFL)).²⁴ The absence of a salary cap has greatly influenced the game of baseball and the way baseball's CBA is structured.²⁵ A salary cap limits the amount of money a team can spend on players' salaries.²⁶ With no salary cap in baseball, big-market teams are able to spend much more money than their smaller-market counterparts.²⁷ This has created a large variation in the amount of money spent on player salaries.

In 2012, the New York Yankees spent more than \$197 million on salaries, most in the league.²⁸ On the other end, the San Diego Padres spent just north of \$55 million on salaries.²⁹ In 2013, the New York Yankees spent more than \$232 million on salaries, again most in the league.³⁰ On the other end, the Houston Astros spent just shy of \$18 million.³¹ While small-market teams such as the Padres and Astros are still able to field competitive teams and achieve success, Major League Baseball has long dealt with this issue of parity.³² In an attempt to create a more level playing field, Major League Baseball and the Players Association recently made several changes to the CBA.

B. 2011 CBA

The CBA was most recently updated in 2011 and will remain in effect through 2016, ensuring twenty-one consecutive years of labor peace.³³ For comparison, the NBA,³⁴ NHL,³⁵ and NFL³⁶ all experienced lockouts, work stoppages, and labor strikes in recent years (2011, 2012, and 2011 respectively).

The current CBA brought various changes to instant replay, scheduling, playoff teams, and the MLB Draft.³⁷ Changing the MLB Draft was the main priority of MLB commissioner Bud Selig during CBA negotiations.³⁸ Prior to the 2011 CBA, teams were able to spend as much as they wished on signing bonuses in the draft. The established “slot recommendations” were exactly that – recommendations. Teams were not punished for exceeding the recommendations. Under the 2011 CBA, however, teams must respect these recommendations and remain below a designated threshold.

Specifically, the 2011 CBA implemented a “signing allocation” for the first ten rounds of the draft.³⁹ Essentially, this is a designated amount that limits teams’ spending ability in the MLB Draft by imposing harsh punishments on teams that exceed their allocated amount.⁴⁰

In 2013, the MLB commissioner recommended signing bonuses starting at \$7.79 million for the top pick and dwindling to \$135,000 for the last pick of the tenth round.⁴¹ The “signing allocation” that a team must stay within is simply the sum of the recommended bonuses the team has in the first ten rounds of the draft.⁴² For example, in 2013, the Chicago Cubs had ten picks in the first ten rounds.⁴³ Each pick came with a recommended signing bonus, ranging from \$6.7 million to \$139,000.⁴⁴ The sum of all these amounts (\$10,556,500) is the maximum total the Cubs could spend on signing bonuses in the first ten rounds.⁴⁵

For players drafted after the first ten rounds (11-40), teams may spend up to \$100,000 to sign a player.⁴⁶ Anything in excess of this amount counts towards the team’s “allocation pool.”⁴⁷ In the 2013 Draft, the Cubs drafted high school pitcher Trevor Clinton in the 12th round and signed him for \$375,000.⁴⁸ The Cubs’ allocated pool (for the first ten rounds) then dropped by \$275,000 from \$10,556,500 to \$10,529,000.

Additionally, if a team drafts but fails to sign a player in the first ten rounds, the team must deduct that player’s “recommended bonus” from the team’s total allocation. In the 2013 Draft, the Philadelphia Phillies drafted Ben Wetzler, a junior from Oregon State, in the fifth round with the 151st overall pick.⁴⁹ The recommended slot amount for this pick was \$315,200.⁵⁰ Because the Phillies failed to sign Wetzler, their allocated pool dropped by \$315,200 (Wetzler’s slot recommendation).⁵¹ This rule increases the importance of signing a team’s first ten picks.

Teams that exceed their allocated totals are subject to certain punishments, including luxury taxes and the loss of future draft picks.⁵² Specifically, the punishments are as follows:⁵³

- (1) a team that goes less than 5% over its allocation must pay a luxury tax of 75% of the amount exceeding the pool;
- (2) a team that goes between 5% and 10% over its allocation must pay a luxury tax of 75% AND forfeit its next first round pick;
- (3) a team that goes 10% to 15% over its allocation must pay a luxury tax of 100% AND forfeit its next first round pick AND forfeit its next second round pick;
- (4) a team that goes 15% or more over its allocation must pay a 100% luxury tax AND forfeit its next *two* first round picks.

III. EFFECTS OF 2011 CBA

A. MLB Draft Strategy

As a result of the new rules and punishments established by the CBA, teams are increasingly more focused on staying within their allocated amount. Failure to do so results in

strict punishments, as outlined above. To avoid these punishments, teams focus on drafting “signable” players who will sign well below the recommended slot.⁵⁴ By signing these players for low amounts, teams can pay their higher picks from top rounds the full recommended slot (or even more), without having to worry about exceeding their allocation pools.

The following players are eligible to be drafted in the MLB Player Draft:⁵⁵

- (1) high school players, if they have graduated from high school and have not yet attended college or junior college;
- (2) college players, from four-year colleges who have either completed their junior or senior years or are at least 21 years old;
- (3) junior college players, regardless of how many years of school they have completed.

Who are the “signable” players that will sign for extremely low amounts? College seniors are the most “signable” players because they have the least leverage in negotiations. High school seniors have the most leverage in negotiations because they can enter college. College juniors also have some leverage because they can return to school. College seniors, however, have little (if any) leverage because they do not have the option to return to school if they do not choose to sign.

If a team were to offer an extremely low amount to a high school player or college junior, the player will most likely refuse to sign because he can still go to school, re-enter the draft, and receive a higher bonus from a team willing to pay it. College seniors, however, are not afforded this luxury. If a college senior fails to sign, his dream of professional baseball all but comes to an end.⁵⁶

Interestingly, this strategy creates a sense of “inflation” in terms of the rounds college seniors are drafted in. College seniors with talent normally drafted in the 15th-20th rounds now might be drafted in the first ten rounds because of their “signability.” Teams are seemingly comfortable in spending a tenth round pick on a less-talented senior if it means more money is available to sign the club’s higher picks. When the Cleveland Indians drafted Trevor Frank in the eighth round, an Indians beat writer explained this was a smart pick because Frank would sign “well underslot so the Indians [would] have extra money for their higher upside prep players they drafted earlier.”⁵⁷

B. Impact on College Seniors

Appendix A lists all college seniors drafted in the first ten rounds of the 2013 MLB Draft. Bonuses for the following draftees represent some of the more extreme cases:

- Daniel Rockett, a college senior from University of Texas at San Antonio, was drafted in the ninth round of the 2013 MLB Draft by the Kansas City Royals.⁵⁸ Rockett signed for \$5,000.⁵⁹ His recommended amount was \$146,800.⁶⁰
- Jacob Zokan was a left-handed pitcher at the College of Charleston.⁶¹ Zokan, a college senior, was drafted in the ninth round of the 2013 MLB Draft by the Seattle Mariners and signed for \$5,000.⁶² His recommended amount was \$145,900.⁶³

- Jerad Grundy, a senior left-handed pitcher from the University of Kentucky, was drafted in the tenth round of the 2013 MLB Draft by the Oakland Athletics.⁶⁴ Grundy received a signing bonus of \$5,000.⁶⁵ His recommended amount was \$135,300.⁶⁶
- Garret Custons was a senior from the United States Air Force Academy.⁶⁷ Custons was drafted in the tenth round by the Toronto Blue Jays.⁶⁸ He received a signing bonus of \$1,000.⁶⁹ His recommended amount was \$136,800.⁷⁰
- Even the top pick (a college senior) in the 2013 MLB Draft received less money than recommended. This player, Mark Appel, a right-handed pitcher from Stanford University, received a signing bonus of \$6.35 million, 18% less than the recommended amount of \$7.9 million.⁷¹
- Contrast Appel’s bonus with that received by Kris Bryant, a third baseman from the University of San Diego, who was drafted second in the 2013 MLB Draft.⁷² Bryant, a college junior, was drafted by the Chicago Cubs and received the slot recommendation of \$6.7 million.⁷³ Despite being drafted higher, Appel received less money than Bryant simply because Appel was a college senior with less leverage. Both had the same agent negotiating for them.⁷⁴ Thus, the players’ agents would seem not to account for their differing bonuses.
- The last pitcher to be taken first overall was Gerrit Cole in 2011.⁷⁵ Cole, then a college junior, received a record-breaking signing bonus of \$8 million.⁷⁶ Thus, Appel’s playing position would also seem not to account for his smaller bonus. Cole and Appel also had the same agent.⁷⁷ Had Appel been a junior, one could argue that he would have received a similar contract to Cole (\$8 M). Instead, Appel received less money than the second overall pick, Bryant (\$6.7 M).

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These are just several examples of college seniors who signed for bonuses less than the recommended amounts. Of the 57 college seniors drafted in the first ten rounds, all 57 signed.⁷⁸ Fifty-five of the 57 signed “below slot,” while 2 signed “at slot.”⁷⁹ These 57 players received a signing bonus worth, on average, 19.77% of the recommended amount.⁸⁰ In the first ten rounds, college seniors received bonuses more than 80% less than the recommended amount.⁸¹ These statistics for college seniors differ drastically from those for college juniors and high school seniors.

College juniors drafted in the first ten rounds received an average signing bonus worth 95.83% of the recommended amount.⁸² On the other hand, high school seniors drafted in the first ten rounds received an average signing bonus worth 119.40% of the recommended amount, nearly 20% more than the slot value.⁸³ Table 1 summarizes these figures.

Table 1. Bonus Averages for 2013 MLB Draft.

Type	Players Drafted	Players Signed	Below Slot	At Slot	Above Slot	Average Percentage of Slot
High School	98	95	33	24	38	119.40%
NCAA Junior	123	119	52	52	15	95.83%
NCAA Senior	57	57	55	2	0	19.77%

C. Impact on College Baseball

Despite hurting college seniors, the 2011 CBA has actually improved college baseball as it has encouraged more high school graduates to attend college. With teams now unlikely to throw very large bonuses at high school graduates due to the allocation pool limits, more and more of these players are forgoing the draft and entering college (in hopes of receiving a larger bonus once they are drafted out of college). “In the first draft under the new rules, the number of high school players rated among Baseball America's top 200 draft-eligible prospects that went unsigned or undrafted increased slightly to 35, up from 26 in the 2011 draft. Of those 35 unsigned or undrafted players, 33 are now playing Division I college baseball.”⁸⁴

College players and their agents understand the troubles college seniors face when trying to negotiate a signing bonus. As a result, college players often sign after junior year (if they are drafted and given the opportunity). Forced to choose between finishing school with a degree and agreeing to a large signing bonus, many players choose the latter.

Johnny Field was a junior at the University of Arizona.⁸⁵ Drafted in the fifth round of the 2013 Draft, Field signed for \$247,500.⁸⁶ The recommended amount was \$294,600.⁸⁷ When asked to explain why he left school early to enter the draft, Field responded: For me, it was always my goal to go to college for 3 years and hopefully perform well enough to put myself in a position to be selected high enough in the draft as a junior to sign ... Some people absolutely love college and want to stay as long as they can before starting their professional careers. However, for the most part it comes down to money. Juniors know if they get selected in the top ten rounds that they have leverage with scouts. If the scouts cannot work with them and meet the number they're looking for, then they can threaten to not sign and return for their senior year. When seniors get drafted, that don't have any leverage and are forced to sign for whatever the scouts offer them, or they won't get the chance to play pro ball.⁸⁸

Those who wish to finish college with a degree must do so with an understanding they will likely receive a tremendously small signing bonus when drafted—much less than what is recommended. The current CBA, thus, fails to protect players who wish to earn a degree. Ironically, the MLB and the 2011 CBA has encouraged more players to start college—yet, it indirectly punishes the ones who finish.

IV. UNFAIR COMPENSATION

As described above, college seniors are severely and negatively impacted by the 2011 CBA. But, is this impact “unfair”? This section will present and reject three arguments that claim this impact is fair. College seniors are, indeed, treated unfairly.

A. Is This Impact “Unfair?”

Argument I: As defined by Merriam-Webster, “fair” actions are those that are “conforming with the established rules.”⁸⁹ According to this definition, teams that offer college seniors low signing bonuses are being fair because they are conforming with the rules established in the 2011 CBA, which allow teams to pay drafted players a signing bonus of any amount—at, above, or below the recommendation.⁹⁰

Response I: Today, however, the concept of “fairness” extends beyond legal standards or definitions.⁹¹ Scholars have recognized the normative aspects of compensation.⁹² Fairness in matters of employment, including wages, implies ethical duties of trust, honesty, and respect.⁹³ As Professor Moriarty, an ethics scholar from Bentley University, notes, “the efficiency of a compensation package or policy does not guarantee its justice.”⁹⁴ Moriarty also states that “paying an employee is a way of *treating* them, and this treatment can be assessed morally. It can be a promise kept or a promise broken. It can betray a lack of respect for the workers and their contributions, or it can respect them.”⁹⁵

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Paying a college senior only 20% of what is recommended hardly seems “fair” or respectful. This lack of “fairness” is further exaggerated when college seniors are compared to college juniors and high school seniors – both of whom earn substantially higher signing bonuses. Surely, there will be some difference as a result of the parties’ respective leverage. However, this becomes problematic when these differences become too large. Professor Bloom, an ethics scholar from the University of Notre Dame, believes that “when they do, both individual and team performance are likely to suffer” because people find such differences “not only unfair, but immoral.”⁹⁶

Argument II: Compensation is “fair” if it has been agreed to by the employer and the employee without “force or fraud.”⁹⁷ Both players (who choose to sign) and their respective teams agree to the signing bonus. Thus, the signing bonus must be “fair.”

Response II: While it is true that the teams are not practicing fraud and there certainly is not physical force, college seniors are often in a situation where they do not have practical choices other than to agree to whatever bonus is offered by a team. Moreover, as Professor Moriarty observed, “agreement” does not necessarily imply fairness.⁹⁸ There are limits to the concept of freedom of contract.⁹⁹ The law has often recognized the limits of “freedom of contract” in the context of wages. For example, the Equal Pay Act mandates equal wages for people who do the same job, regardless of sex.¹⁰⁰ Minimum wage laws also require employers pay employees at least a certain wage, even if the two agreed to a lower one.¹⁰¹ Similarly, although the bonuses paid to colleges seniors are not contrary to legislation, the CBA’s slot recommendations indicate fair bonuses. Bonuses far below these slots should be recognized as unfair.

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Argument III: Just as the market establishes prices for other things, the market establishes the compensation of workers through the laws of supply and demand. Firms are “wage-takers”, not “wage-makers.” They simply take the wage suggested by the market equilibrium; they do not make the wage.

Response III: This argument would hold (somewhat) more weight for regular contracts during the season.¹⁰² After the draft, if a player is vastly underpaid, he can leave the team (once his contract expires) for a team willing to pay him better. If teams pay too low, they will not be able to capture or retain top talent. If teams pay too high, they will incur unnecessary expenses. The MLB Draft, however, presents a different story.

First, Major League Baseball, with regards to the draft, acts as a monopsonist, a single buyer for a product or service of many sellers. Major League Baseball is the only professional baseball league in the United States. Major League Baseball acts as a single buyer of baseball players. Professor Richard Craswell of the University of Chicago noted that “monopolized markets may not behave as well as markets where there’s lots of competition.”¹⁰³

Second, because of the structure of the draft, there is not a market amongst the thirty individual teams, like how there might be in the regular season. Once a team drafts a player, that team is the only “buyer” for that player. The player cannot accept any offers from the twenty-nine other teams.

As a league, Major League Baseball does not operate in a proper market. In the draft, teams do not operate in a proper market. Major League Baseball and its teams are “price-makers” in the draft, not “price-takers.”

The three counterarguments mentioned above are weak for the reasons mentioned. The responses to each suggest that college seniors are, indeed, treated unfairly.

B. College Seniors Are Treated Unfairly

While Mark Appel, the aforementioned number one draft pick, did receive less than the recommended amount, the underpayment was not severe enough to be considered “unfair.”¹⁰⁴ With no salary cap and no “hard slot” system, there will be bonuses that fall above and below the recommendation as a result of negotiations and the system that is in place. Like Appel’s, not all bonuses that fall below the recommendation are “unfair.” Appel, and several other draftees, received fair bonuses. However, for college seniors, Appel is the exception - not the norm.

Most college seniors are unfairly treated with bonuses extremely below the recommendation. Of the 57 college seniors who were drafted and signed in the first ten rounds, 51 of them received bonuses more than 50% less than the recommendation.¹⁰⁵ Forty-eight of them received bonuses more than 70% less than the recommendation.¹⁰⁶

With little leverage in negotiations, these college seniors are taken advantage of and given bonuses that do not accurately reflect their position in the draft.¹⁰⁷ Teams exploit these players so they have more money to offer their other picks. Treatment of the lower-paid players smacks of coercion. College seniors are primarily treated as a means to an end. College seniors in the MLB Draft are valued as helpless, cheap opportunities for teams attempting to comply with the new draft regulations.

Paul Sewald, a pitcher from University of San Diego, was drafted by the New York Mets as a college senior in the tenth round of the 2012 Draft.¹⁰⁸ Sewald received a signing bonus of \$1,000 – substantially below the recommended slot of \$125,000.¹⁰⁹ When asked to describe the negotiation process, Sewald commented:

There was a small opportunity to negotiate. With the [2011] CBA, many teams want to negotiate deals before the draft to let them know exactly who they can and cannot draft as to not waste a pick therefore wasting the money slot...When the Mets called on draft day, the scout merely offered the \$1,000 bonus to be picked in the 10th round and do a favor for the organization...It’s a little depressing receiving a mere \$1,000 while many players are getting \$100, \$200, \$500 thousand, even \$1 million.¹¹⁰

After they are drafted and signed, players enter the minor leagues before working their way up for a chance at Major League Baseball. Minor leaguers are subject to extremely small salaries. The base minimum salary per month for a AAA player (the highest minor league) is \$2,150.¹¹¹ The base minimum per month for a Rookie player (the lowest minor league) is \$1,150.¹¹² Additionally,

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minor league players receive a daily stipend of \$20-\$25 for meals.¹¹³ These small living wages make it very difficult for players to live comfortably.¹¹⁴

With minor league salaries quite small, players are forced to live off their signing bonuses until they land a major league contract (if they are given the opportunity).¹¹⁵ Signing bonuses provide a source of income for minor leaguers so they can live a bit more comfortably. College seniors (such as Frank, Rockett, Zokan, Gundry, Custons, Sewald, and others) who are awarded just a few thousand dollars as a signing bonus must live on even smaller budgets.

Small minor league salaries emphasize the importance of the signing bonus. College seniors, however, are taken advantage of in the MLB Draft's current bonus recommendation system.

V. PROPOSAL: A MINIMUM GURANTEE FOR COLLEGE SENIORS

A solution to this unjust treatment is possible, easily implemented, and greatly needed. Just as the law has mandated minimum wages and prohibited certain types of wage discrimination to mandate a level of "fairness," it would be appropriate for Major League Baseball and the Players Association to put protections for college seniors in place.¹¹⁶ For college seniors drafted in the first ten rounds, the CBA needs to guarantee a certain percentage of the recommended slot. For example, a college senior drafted in the first ten rounds would have a minimum guarantee of 50% of the recommended slot. This percentage is fairly arbitrary and can be left to the discretion of MLB and the MLBPA. However, it should fall somewhere between 20% (the percentage college seniors currently receive, on average) and 95% (the percentage college juniors currently receive, on average). Thus, 50% appears to be a reasonable percentage.

For college seniors drafted outside the first ten rounds (where recommended bonuses do not exist), the CBA needs to guarantee a minimum amount dependent on the round drafted. For example, a college senior drafted in the eleventh round may have a minimum guarantee of \$30,000. A college senior drafted in the 30th round may have a minimum guarantee of \$10,000.

Players would still be able to negotiate higher bonuses; however, a base guarantee would set a floor for each college senior. This differs significantly from a "hard-slotted system" where players receive an exact pre-determined amount based on the slot drafted.¹¹⁷ This proposal still allows for players and teams to negotiate bonuses and would not apply to other draft-eligible players such as college juniors, high school seniors, and junior college players. Unlike a "hard-slotted system", this proposal would maintain the spirit of a free market with no salary cap.¹¹⁸

One objection would be the possible negative effect on players taken early in the draft. If teams were forced to pay more to college seniors in the draft, they would have less money available to pay their top picks. However, these top picks would still be paid extremely well, making this effect negligible. For example, if a team gave its drafted seniors a total of \$100,000 more, this team would theoretically have \$100,000 less to spend on higher picks. Mark Appel, for instance, may have received \$6.25 million instead of \$6.35 million. Another option would be for the team to spread this \$100,000 across multiple picks, making the effect even more negligible. This hardly seems to be a problematic issue, especially when compared to the positive effects.

With this proposal, the MLB would: (1) protect student-athletes who wish to finish with a degree,¹¹⁹ (2) improve the college game, as more talented juniors would stay in college, (3) foster the importance of education and a college degree, (4) improve the quality of athletes in the minor and major leagues, and (5) uphold the integrity of the draft.

Under the current CBA, college baseball players (if drafted) are usually drafted after their junior year.¹²⁰ These players are then faced with two options: (1) sign with the team and, in doing so, leave college, or (2) remain in school and re-enter the draft as a senior. College seniors, as explained earlier, often receive very low signing bonuses if they are drafted.¹²¹ As a result, many college juniors choose option (1), forgoing their final year of school. Unfortunately, student-athletes who wish to complete school – and do so – are forced to sacrifice large signing bonuses in exchange for their degrees. This proposed solution would protect these students by guaranteeing them a certain monetary amount and allowing them to complete school without making such a substantial sacrifice.

Secondly, if college seniors were protected by the CBA, more college juniors would remain in school. Currently, many drafted juniors choose to sign and leave college because they understand the troubles seniors face when trying to negotiate a signing bonus. If these troubles were solved, more juniors would be more inclined to remain in school. With more talented juniors staying in school, the overall college game would improve.

Johnny Field, the aforementioned player who left for the draft and signed after his junior year, commented:

If seniors could still get *slot* (the recommended amount) like they could as juniors and not worry about losing money or falling lower in the draft, then I believe a lot of juniors would come back for their senior year to try and improve and compete for a championship and, most importantly, receive their degree and enjoy another year of college. I would have highly considered returning for my senior year if this [solution] was implemented.¹²²

Thirdly, Major League Baseball would continue to emphasize the importance of a college education. The latest CBA has encouraged more players to start school.¹²³ With the restrictions on draft eligibility, it also forces student-athletes to stay in school (usually for three years).¹²⁴ The CBA encourages players to both start and stay in school. With this proposal, the CBA would finally encourage students to finish school.

Fourthly, teams can actually help themselves by paying college seniors a larger signing bonus (as long as they remain within their allocated amounts). In doing so, teams would be letting these players live more comfortable lives with a larger budget. With a larger signing bonus, these players would be able to eat better, train better, and live better – giving them a better opportunity to reach the big leagues and help their respective teams. In today's workplace, research shows that employees provide more value to the employer when they are valued and respected.¹²⁵ By giving these seniors signing bonuses that are more reflective of the recommended amount, these players will feel more appreciated – empowering them to perform better and provide more value to the organization. “People expect more from their organizations than economic rationality or meeting minimal standards for appropriate conduct. People aspire to be a part of organizations that they see as just, moral, even virtuous.”¹²⁶

Lastly, this proposal would uphold the integrity of the draft. Another objection to this proposal might suggest that these “exploited seniors” in the first ten rounds will now be taken later in the draft (because they can no longer be exploited for strategic purposes). However, this objection is actually a positive effect of the proposal. Recall that the 2011 CBA has “inflated” certain seniors' draft positions. Seniors with talent normally drafted in the 20th round are now being drafted in the tenth. With this proposal, teams would not be able to exploit these players,

and these players would fall to their expected draft position. Now, players drafted in the tenth round (for example) would actually be players with “tenth-round talent.” This provides a nice benchmark when evaluating players. No longer does one have to wonder if a player was taken in the tenth round because of talent or because of financial reasons and draft strategy.

This proposal is just one step in the right direction. After the draft, minor league players are continuously exploited with low wages.¹²⁷ In February of 2014, three former minor league players filed a class-action lawsuit against Major League Baseball claiming minor league players are paid below minimum wage.¹²⁸ While this issue is worthy of an article of its own, the aforementioned proposal would be a positive step in fairly compensating players.

VI. CONCLUSION

Major League Baseball and its Players Association continue to promote labor peace with the latest collective-bargaining agreement, signed in 2011. This CBA brought several changes to the game of baseball. Arguably, the biggest change this CBA brought was the new rules regarding the MLB Amateur Player Draft. Specifically, the CBA enforced a “spending pool” for the first ten rounds for all teams. While this has improved the college game and has encouraged more high school players to enter college, it exploits the players who finish college. Drafted college seniors are consistently given signing bonuses that fall extremely below the recommended amount. These players are mostly looked upon as helpless, affordable options so teams can comply with new draft regulations.

The 2011 CBA will be in effect through the 2016 season. Then, the Players Association and Major League Baseball will negotiate a new CBA. This presents an optimal time to consider the above proposal and have it in place for the 2017 Draft. Furthermore, the MLBPA and MLB will both have new executives negotiating this upcoming CBA. The Players Association already has a new executive director, Tony Clark.¹²⁹ Major League Baseball is expected to have a new commissioner as the current commissioner, Bud Selig, is expected to retire this season.¹³⁰ Agreeing to a proposal such as this would allow Clark and the new commissioner to immediately have a positive impact.¹³¹ By implementing a minimum guarantee for college seniors, Major League Baseball and its Players Association would protect these players from being unfairly exploited.

¹ Trevor Frank, *UC Riverside Baseball*, http://gohighlanders.com/roster.aspx?path=baseball&rp_id=2635.

² *Id.*

³ Eugene Tierney, *2013 MLB Draft Signing Tracker*, 85% SPORTS (June 8, 2013), <http://www.85percentsports.com/2013/06/08/2013-mlb-draft-signing-tracker/>.

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ Patrick O’Kennedy, *MLB’s Draft Slotting System: How It Works*, SB NATION: BLESS YOU BOYS (June 26, 2013), <http://www.blessyouboys.com/2013/6/26/4463258/MLB-draft-slotting-bonus-pools-penalties>.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ Of the 271 players that were signed in the first ten rounds, 140 (51.6%) received bonuses less than the recommendation. See Appendices A and B. The information compiled in these tables was obtained from Eugene Tierney, *2013 MLB Draft Signing Tracker*, 85% SPORTS (June 8, 2013), <http://www.85percentsports.com/2013/06/08/2013-mlb-draft-signing-tracker/>.

⁸ Once a player agrees to a bonus and signs, that player can start playing professionally. A player cannot start playing until he agrees to a signing bonus.

⁹ Agents negotiate on behalf of players. Agents are paid on commission at around 5% of the player’s contract. *Insight Into Being a Baseball Agent*, SPORTS AGENT BLOG, <http://sportsagentblog.com/2009/02/10/insight-into-being-a-baseball-agent/>.

¹⁰ On average, college juniors drafted in the first ten rounds of the 2013 MLB Draft received 4.17% less than the recommended amount. See Appendix B. While high school seniors received an average bonus above the recommended slot. See Appendix C.

¹¹ See Appendix A.

¹² *Id.*

¹³ Major League Baseball's CBA does not directly prohibit college seniors from receiving large bonuses. Seniors, as are other players, are allowed to receive a bonus of any monetary amount.

¹⁴ Fifty-seven college seniors were drafted – and signed – in the first ten rounds of the 2013 MLB Draft. Fifty-five of them received bonuses less than the recommended amount.

¹⁵ See generally Major League Baseball CBA (2012-2016), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf

¹⁶ For more on the role of the MLBPA and the CBA, see Rick J. Lopez, Comment, *Signing Bonus Skimming and a Premature Call for a Global Draft in Major League Baseball*, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 349, 355 (2009). Although MLB is exempted from antitrust laws, the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2006), requires certain protections for major league baseball players. *Id.*

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ See MLB, *Major League Baseball Players Association: Frequently Asked Questions*, available at <http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp>

¹⁹ William B. Gould, IV, *Globalization in Collective Bargaining, Baseball, and Matsuzaka: Labor and Antitrust Law on the Diamond*, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 283, 286 (2007).

²⁰ *History of the Major League Players Association*, MLB, <http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/history.jsp>.

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Id.*

²³ For more history of baseball's CBA, see Nicholas A. Deming, *Drafting a Solution: Impact of the New Salary System on the First Year Major League Baseball Amateur Draft*, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 427 (2012), and Andrew P. Hanson, *The Trend Toward Principled Negotiation in Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining*, 15 SPORTS LAW. J 221 (2008).

²⁴ Howard Bryant, *Off Balance*, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/8390834/mlb-2012-season-proves-salary-caps-not-necessary-espn-magazine

²⁵ See Christopher D. Cameron & J. Michael Echevarria, *The Ploys of Summer: Antitrust, Industrial Distrust, and the Case Against a Salary Cap for Major League Baseball*, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827 (1995)

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ Big-market teams include teams from cities such as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Boston. Small-market teams include teams from cities such as Oakland, Seattle, Tampa Bay, and San Diego.

²⁸ *MLB Opening Day Team Payrolls*, YAHOO! SPORTS, <http://sports.yahoo.com/news/mlb--mlb-opening-day-team-payrolls--infographic--172007462.html>.

²⁹ *Id.*

³⁰ *Baseball Salaries for 2013*, NEWSDAY, <http://sports.newsday.com/long-island/data/baseball/mlb-salaries-2013/>.

³¹ *Id.*

³² Small-market teams can still be successful by drafting well, finding relatively cheap and underappreciated players, excellent coaching, etc.

³³ Nicholas A. Deming, *Drafting a Solution: Impact of the New Salary System on the First Year Major League Baseball Amateur Draft*, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., 427 (2012).

³⁴ William B. Gould IV, *The 2011 Basketball Lockout: The Union Lives to Fight Another Day – Just Barely*, 64 STANFORD L. REV. ONLINE 51 (2012), available at <http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/2011-basketball-lockout>

³⁵ Dan Gelston, *NHL Lockout 2012: League Imposes Fourth Work Stoppage Since 1992*, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/16/nhl-lockout-2012-work-stoppage-hockey_n_1887536.html

³⁶ Robert H. Lattinville, Robert A. Boland, & Bennett Speyer, *Labor Pains: The Effect of a Work Stoppage in the NFL on its Coaches*, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 335 (2010), available at <http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol20/iss2/3>.

³⁷ Jayson Stark, *How the New CBA Changes Baseball*, ESPN (Nov. 22, 2011), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/7270203/baseball-new-labor-deal-truly-historic-one.

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ *Summary of Major League Baseball Players Association – Major League Baseball Labor Agreement*, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, available for download at mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/2011_CBA.pdf

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ Eugene Tierney, *2013 MLB Draft Signing Tracker*, 85% SPORTS (June 8, 2013),

<http://www.85percentsports.com/2013/06/08/2013-mlb-draft-signing-tracker/>

⁴² *Summary of Major League Baseball Players Association – Major League Baseball Labor Agreement*, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, available for download at mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/2011_CBA.pdf

⁴³ Brett Taylor, *How Is the Cubs' Draft Bonus Pool Shaping Up So Far, ?* BLEACHER NATION (June 21, 2013), <http://www.bleachernation.com/2013/06/21/how-is-the-cubs-draft-bonus-pool-shaping-up-so-far/>.

⁴⁴ *Id.*

⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸ Brett Taylor, *Cubs Officially Add Two Later Round Slots: Trevor Clifton and Will Remillard* (July 12, 2013), BLEACHER NATION, <http://www.bleachernation.com/2013/07/12/cubs-officially-add-two-later-round-over-slots-trevor-clifton-and-will-remillard/comment-page-1/>

⁴⁹ Eugene Tierney, *2013 MLB Draft Signing Tracker*, 85% SPORTS (June 8, 2013),

<http://www.85percentsports.com/2013/06/08/2013-mlb-draft-signing-tracker/>

⁵⁰ *Id.*

⁵¹ *Id.*

⁵² Proceeds from the tax go to smaller-market teams and teams that did not overspend in the draft. This is another attempt to establish parity and help teams from smaller markets with smaller payrolls.

⁵³ *Summary of Major League Baseball Players Association – Major League Baseball Labor Agreement*, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, available for download at mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/2011_CBA.pdf

⁵⁴ Many teams talk with players prior to the draft and see if they will sign for a certain amount.

⁵⁵ *First-Year Player Draft Official Rules*, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, <http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp>

⁵⁶ J.D. Drew was considered one of the best college players available in the 1997 Draft. Drew, then a senior, was drafted with the second pick. Though he was looking for a reported \$10 million, he was only offered \$2 million (because he was a college senior with little leverage). Drew did not sign and, instead, played in an independent league. Drew re-entered the Draft in 1998 and signed for \$3 million. Drew played professionally for 13 years, was nominated as an All-Star (2008), and won a World Series Championship (2007). J.D. Drew is one of the few exceptions of college seniors who are talented and brave enough to choose this option. It is worth noting that Drew still received well less than the \$10 million he wanted. John Sickels, *Career Profile: JD Drew*, SB NATION MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (Apr. 30, 2011), <http://www.minorleagueball.com/2011/4/30/2143308/career-profile-j-d-drew>

⁵⁷ Tony Lastoria, *2013 Indians 8th Round Pick: RHP Trevor Frank*, INDIANS BASEBALL INSIDER (June 7, 2013), <http://www.indiansbaseballinsider.com/blog/2013-indians-8th-round-pick-rhp-trevor-frank-49028>.

⁵⁸ Eugene Tierney, *2013 MLB Draft Signing Tracker*, 85% SPORTS (June 8, 2013),

<http://www.85percentsports.com/2013/06/08/2013-mlb-draft-signing-tracker/>

⁵⁹ *Id.*

⁶⁰ *Id.*

⁶¹ *Id.*

⁶² *Id.*

⁶³ *Id.*

⁶⁴ *Id.*

⁶⁵ *Id.*

⁶⁶ *Id.*

⁶⁷ *Id.*

⁶⁸ *Id.*

⁶⁹ *Id.*

⁷⁰ *Id.*

⁷¹ *Id.*

⁷² Aaron Gleeman, *Cubs sign No. 2 Overall Pick Kris Bryant for \$6.7 Million*, HARDBALL TALK NBC SPORTS (July 10, 2013), <http://hardballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/07/10/cubs-sign-no-2-overall-pick-kris-bryant-for-6-7-million/>

⁷³ *Id.*

⁷⁴ Scott Boras represented both players. Boras is widely considered the premier agent in all of professional sports.

⁷⁵ *Gerrit Cole Signs Contract with Pittsburgh Pirates that Includes \$8 Million Signing Bonus*, HUFFINGTON POST, (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/16/gerrit-cole-pirates-sign-contract_n_927969.html.

⁷⁶ *Id.*

⁷⁷ Scott Boras represented both players.

⁷⁸ *See* Appendix A.

⁷⁹ “Below slot” represents signing bonuses that fall below the recommended amount. “At slot” represents bonuses that exactly match the recommended amount. *See* Appendix A for signing bonuses and slot values.

⁸⁰ *See* Appendix A.

⁸¹ *See id.*

⁸² *See* Appendix B.

⁸³ *See* Appendix C.

⁸⁴ *More baseball players likely choosing college game over pros with signing bonuses dwindling*, FOX NEWS (Apr. 11, 2013), <http://www.foxnews.com/sports/2013/04/11/more-baseball-players-likely-choosing-college-game-over-pros-with-signing/>.

⁸⁵ Eugene Tierney, *2013 MLB Draft Signing Tracker*, 85% SPORTS (June 8, 2013), <http://www.85percentsports.com/2013/06/08/2013-mlb-draft-signing-tracker/>.

⁸⁶ *Id.*

⁸⁷ *Id.*

⁸⁸ I spoke directly with Field on Jan. 22, 2014. This information was exchanged via Facebook messages.

⁸⁹ “fair.” *Merriam-Webster.com*. 2013. <http://www.merriam-webster.com> (Aug. 3, 2013).

⁹⁰ *See supra*, text accompanying note 13.

⁹¹ Matt Bloom, *The Ethics of Compensation Systems*, 52 J. BUS. ETHICS 149, 149 (2004).

⁹² *Id.* *See also* Jeffrey Moriarty, *Justice in Compensation: A Defense*, 21 BUS. ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REV. 64, 68 (2012).

⁹³ Bloom, *supra* note 91.

⁹⁴ Moriarty, *supra* note 92 at 65. *See also* David R. Francis, *High Wages, Low Wages, and Morality*, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 30, 2006), available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0130/p14s01-cogn.html>. Francis talks about a public advocacy group, ACORN, which has been “winning a higher ‘living wage’ for workers in state after state, city after city, by appealing to voters’ sense of justice.” Jen Kern, director of ACORN’s Living Wage Resource Center, says that appealing to voters’ sense of justice is a strategy that has proven successful. “It’s probably the best [argument] we have. A decent income is a moral matter of fairness.”

⁹⁵ Moriarty, *supra* note 92 at 65. *See also* D.G. Arnold & N.E. Bowie, *Sweatshops and Respect for Persons*, BUS. ETHICS Q., 13:2, 221-242.

⁹⁶ Bloom, *supra* note 91 at 150.

⁹⁷ Moriarty, *supra* note 92, at 68.

⁹⁸ Moriarty, *supra* note 92. “A just wage is not necessarily whatever wage is agreed to by employers and employees without force or fraud.”

⁹⁹ “A person who would give away too much of his own liberty must be protected from himself, no matter how rational his decision or compelling the circumstances.” Anthony T. Kronman, *Paternalism and the Law of Contracts*, 92 YALE L.J. 775 (1983.)

¹⁰⁰ *The Equal Pay Act of 1963*, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, <http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/epa.cfm>

¹⁰¹ *The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, As Amended*, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, <http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/statutes/FairLaborStandAct.pdf>

¹⁰² Even in a perfect market, this argument is still faulty. *See* Moriarty, *supra* note 92.

¹⁰³ Richard Craswell, *Freedom of Contract*, 5, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/33.Craswell.FrdmCntrct_0.pdf

¹⁰⁴ Appel only received about 20% less than the recommended slot.

¹⁰⁵ *See* Appendix A.

¹⁰⁶ *Id.*

¹⁰⁷ In the first ten rounds, college seniors received bonuses that averaged more than 80% less than the recommended amounts. *See* Appendix A.

¹⁰⁸ James Watkins, *High MLB Draft Picks Sign for \$1,000 Apiece*, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 4, 2012), <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/high-mlb-draft-pifederalcks-sign-1000-apiece>

¹⁰⁹ *Id.*

¹¹⁰ I spoke directly with Sewald on Aug. 10, 2013. This information was exchanged via text messages.

¹¹¹ Harold Uhlman, *Life in the Minor Leagues*, THINK BLUE LA (Jan. 29, 2013), <http://www.thinkbluea.com/index.php/2013/01/29/life-in-the-minor-leagues/>.

¹¹² *Id.*

¹¹³ *Id.*

¹¹⁴ Phil Coke is a pitcher for the Detroit Tigers. During his six years in the minors, Coke was forced to live on a steady diet of cheap and unhealthy fast food. Currently listed at 215 pounds, Coke ballooned to 245 pounds during his time in the minors. In an interview with Jonah Keri, Coke said: “For minor leaguers, being broke also means subsisting just about entirely on fast food, a curious way for teams to develop finely tuned athletes.” *Id.*

¹¹⁵ Sewald echoed this by saying that “a signing bonus is really just an amount of money to hold a player off until he reaches the big [leagues].”

¹¹⁶ Moriarty, *supra* note 92 at 69.

¹¹⁷ A “hard-slotted” system establishes bonuses for each pick and bonuses are not open for negotiation. See Nicholas A. Deming, *Drafting a Solution: Impact of the New Salary System on the First Year Major League Baseball Amateur Draft*, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., 427 (2012).

¹¹⁸ For more on the problems and disadvantages of a hard-slotted system, see Bradley R. Bultman, *Drafted Player Compensation: Incorrectly Hidden in the Afternoon Shadow of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption*, 11 FL. COASTAL L. REV. 687 (2010).

¹¹⁹ For more on protecting college players, see Glenn M. Wong, Warren Zola, & Chris Deubert, *Going Pro in Sports: Providing Guidance to Student-Athletes in a Complicated Legal & Regulatory Environments*, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 553 (2011)

¹²⁰ As per draft eligibility rules, see *supra* note 55. Some may be drafted after sophomore year if they meet the age requirement (21 years old).

¹²¹ College seniors receive bonuses roughly 80% less than the recommended amount.

¹²² I spoke directly with Field on January 22, 2014. This information was exchanged via Facebook messages.

¹²³ *More baseball players likely choosing college game over pros with signing bonuses dwindling*, FOX NEWS (Apr. 11, 2013), <http://www.foxnews.com/sports/2013/04/11/more-baseball-players-likely-choosing-college-game-over-pros-with-signing/>

¹²⁴ As per draft eligibility rules, see *supra* note 55. College players cannot enter the draft until they complete their junior year or until they turn 21.

¹²⁵ Bloom, *supra* note 91.

¹²⁶ *Id.*

¹²⁷ Ted Berg, *Most Minor League Ballplayers Earn Less Than Half as Much Money as Fast-Food Workers*, USA TODAY (Mar. 6, 2014) <http://ftw.usatoday.com/2014/03/minor-leaguers-working-poor-lawsuit-mlb-bud-selig/>.

¹²⁸ Michael McCann, *In Lawsuit Minor Leaguers Charge They Are Members of ‘Working Poor’*, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 12, 2014) <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/mlb/news/20140212/minor-league-baseball-players-lawsuit/>

¹²⁹ Barry Svrluga, *Tony Clark Named Executive Director of Major League Baseball Players Association*, WASH.POST (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/nationals/tony-clark-named-executive-director-of-major-league-baseball-players-association/2013/12/03/e876855a-5c66-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_story.html

¹³⁰ Maury Brown, *When Could Bud Selig’s Replacement Be Announced? Sooner Than You Think*, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2014), <http://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2014/03/14/when-could-bud-seligs-replacement-be-announced-sooner-than-you-think/>

¹³¹ The new commissioner is expected to be Rob Manfred, the COO of Major League Baseball and second in command behind Selig. See Maury Brown, *The Next Commissioner of Major League Baseball Likely to Be...*, FORBES (Dec. 13, 2013), <http://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2013/12/13/the-next-commissioner-of-major-league-baseball-likely-to-be/>.

APPENDIX A: COLLEGE SENIORS (2013 MLB DRAFT ROUNDS 1-10)

Pick	Player	Signed	Slot	+/-	Percent
1	Mark Appel	\$6,350,000	\$7,790,400	(\$1,440,400)	-18.49%
68	Jake Johansen	\$820,000	\$820,000	\$0	0.00%
116	L.J. Mazzilli	\$300,000	\$441,800	(\$141,800)	-32.10%

125	Mason Katz	\$95,000	\$405,100	(\$310,100)	-76.55%
156	Buck Farmer	\$225,000	\$300,400	(\$75,400)	-25.10%
174	Luke Farrell	\$75,000	\$252,500	(\$177,500)	-70.30%
175	Matt Boyd	\$75,000	\$250,100	(\$175,100)	-70.01%
182	Garrett Cooper	\$30,000	\$233,700	(\$203,700)	-87.16%
183	James Dykstra	\$30,000	\$231,500	(\$201,500)	-87.04%
185	Jimmy Reed	\$40,000	\$227,100	(\$187,100)	-82.39%
194	John Murphy	\$20,000	\$208,300	(\$188,300)	-90.40%
203	Mike Adams	\$150,000	\$191,100	(\$41,100)	-21.51%
204	Kyle Bartsch	\$10,000	\$189,200	(\$179,200)	-94.71%
216	Connor Harrell	\$55,000	\$168,700	(\$113,700)	-67.40%
231	Trevor Frank	\$10,000	\$158,300	(\$148,300)	-93.68%
233	Forrestt Allday	\$10,000	\$157,500	(\$147,500)	-93.65%
234	Cody Stubbs	\$75,000	\$157,200	(\$82,200)	-52.29%
235	Kendall Graveman	\$5,000	\$156,900	(\$151,900)	-96.81%
237	Tyler Smith	\$20,000	\$156,100	(\$136,100)	-87.19%
241	Justin Parr	\$15,000	\$154,700	(\$139,700)	-90.30%
244	Kyle Farmer	\$40,000	\$153,600	(\$113,600)	-73.96%
245	Andrew Pierce	\$10,000	\$153,300	(\$143,300)	-93.48%
247	Nate Smith	\$12,000	\$152,600	(\$140,600)	-92.14%
252	Tyler Horan	\$150,900	\$150,900	\$0	0.00%
254	Brandon Thomas	\$75,000	\$150,200	(\$75,200)	-50.07%
255	Scott Brattvet	\$15,000	\$149,900	(\$134,900)	-89.99%
256	David Napoli	\$15,000	\$149,500	(\$134,500)	-89.97%
260	Mitchell Garver	\$40,000	\$148,100	(\$108,100)	-72.99%
263	Kyle Martin	\$10,000	\$147,200	(\$137,200)	-93.21%
264	Daniel Rockett	\$5,000	\$146,800	(\$141,800)	-96.59%
265	Chad Girodo	\$5,000	\$146,500	(\$141,500)	-96.59%
266	Patrick Biondi	\$10,000	\$146,200	(\$136,200)	-93.16%
267	Jacob Zokan	\$5,000	\$145,900	(\$140,900)	-96.57%
268	Adam Cimber	\$5,000	\$145,500	(\$140,500)	-96.56%
270	Grant Nelson	\$10,000	\$144,800	(\$134,800)	-93.09%
271	Shane Martin	\$5,000	\$144,400	(\$139,400)	-96.54%
273	Nick Blount	\$10,000	\$143,800	(\$133,800)	-93.05%
274	Henry Yates	\$5,000	\$143,500	(\$138,500)	-96.52%
275	Nick Petree	\$40,000	\$143,100	(\$103,100)	-72.05%
280	Jose Samayoa	\$10,000	\$141,500	(\$131,500)	-92.93%
286	Jake Joyce	\$15,000	\$139,700	(\$124,700)	-89.26%
288	Zachary Godley	\$35,000	\$139,000	(\$104,000)	-74.82%
289	Michael Tauchman	\$10,000	\$138,700	(\$128,700)	-92.79%

293	Taylor Grover	\$10,000	\$137,400	(\$127,400)	-.92.72%
295	Garrett Custons	\$1,000	\$136,800	(\$135,800)	-.99.27%
297	Emilio Pagan	\$5,000	\$136,200	(\$131,200)	-.96.33%
301	Jon Prosinski	\$5,000	\$135,300	(\$130,300)	-.96.30%
302	Michael Ratterree	\$25,000	\$135,300	(\$110,300)	-.81.52%
303	Brad Goldberg	\$10,000	\$135,300	(\$125,300)	-.92.61%
307	Grant Gordon	\$5,000	\$135,300	(\$130,300)	-.96.30%
308	Aaron Griffin	\$3,000	\$135,300	(\$132,300)	-.97.78%
309	Austin Wynns	\$10,000	\$135,300	(\$125,300)	-.92.61%
311	Jerad Grundy	\$5,000	\$135,300	(\$130,300)	-.96.30%
312	Tyler Rogers	\$8,000	\$135,300	(\$127,300)	-.94.09%
314	Tyler Webb	\$30,000	\$135,300	(\$105,300)	-.77.83%
315	Daniel Wright	\$10,000	\$135,300	(\$125,300)	-.92.61%
316	Brennan Middleton	\$10,000	\$135,300	(\$125,300)	-.92.61%

APPENDIX B: COLLEGE JUNIORS (2013 MLB DRAFT ROUNDS 1-10)

Pick	Player	Signed	Slot	+/-	Percent
2	Kris Bryant	\$6,708,400	\$6,708,400	\$0	0.00%
3	Jonathan Gray	\$4,800,000	\$5,626,400	(\$826,400)	-14.69%
6	Colin Moran	\$3,516,500	\$3,516,500	\$0	0.00%
7	Trey Ball	\$2,750,000	\$3,246,500	(\$496,500)	-15.29%
8	Hunter Dozier	\$2,200,000	\$3,137,800	(\$937,800)	-29.89%
13	Hunter Renfroe	\$2,678,000	\$2,678,000	\$0	0.00%
15	Braden Shipley	\$2,250,000	\$2,434,500	(\$184,500)	-7.58%
17	Tim Anderson	\$2,164,000	\$2,164,000	\$0	0.00%
18	Chris Anderson	\$2,109,900	\$2,109,900	\$0	0.00%
19	Marco Gonzalez	\$1,850,000	\$2,055,800	(\$205,800)	-10.01%
20	Jonathan Crawford	\$2,001,700	\$2,001,700	\$0	0.00%
23	Alex Gonzalez	\$2,215,000	\$1,920,600	\$294,400	15.33%
26	Eric Jagiello	\$1,839,400	\$1,839,400	\$0	0.00%
27	Phil Ervin	\$1,812,400	\$1,812,400	\$0	0.00%
29	Ryne Stanek	\$1,758,300	\$1,758,300	\$0	0.00%
31	Jason Hursh	\$1,704,200	\$1,704,200	\$0	0.00%
32	Aaron Judge	\$1,800,000	\$1,677,100	\$122,900	7.33%
34	Sean Manaea	\$3,550,000	\$1,623,000	\$1,927,000	118.73%
36	Aaron Blair	\$1,435,000	\$1,547,700	(\$112,700)	-7.28%
38	Michael Lorenzen	\$1,500,000	\$1,470,500	\$29,500	2.01%
39	Corey Knebel	\$1,433,400	\$1,433,400	\$0	0.00%
40	Andrew Thurman	\$1,397,200	\$1,397,200	\$0	0.00%
41	Rob Zastryzny	\$1,100,000	\$1,361,900	(\$261,900)	-19.23%

43	Ryan Eades	\$1,294,100	\$1,294,100	\$0	0.00%
44	Trevor Williams	\$1,261,400	\$1,261,400	\$0	0.00%
49	Austin Wilson	\$1,700,000	\$1,110,000	\$590,000	53.15%
53	Andrew Knapp	\$1,033,100	\$1,033,100	\$0	0.00%
56	Tom Windle	\$986,500	\$986,500	\$0	0.00%
58	Kevin Ziomek	\$956,600	\$956,600	\$0	0.00%
63	Dillon Overton	\$400,000	\$885,600	(\$485,600)	-54.83%
70	Alex Balog	\$795,200	\$795,200	\$0	0.00%
71	Chad Pinder	\$750,000	\$782,900	(\$32,900)	-4.20%
73	Colby Suggs	\$600,000	\$759,200	(\$159,200)	-20.97%
74	Kent Emanuel	\$747,700	\$747,700	\$0	0.00%
77	Sam Moll	\$600,000	\$713,900	(\$113,900)	-15.95%
78	Stuart Turner	\$550,000	\$703,000	(\$153,000)	-21.76%
79	Dace Kime	\$525,000	\$692,200	(\$167,200)	-24.15%
86	Bryan Verbitsky	\$400,000	\$621,400	(\$221,400)	-35.63%
87	JaCoby Jones	\$612,000	\$612,000	\$0	0.00%
88	Daniel Palka	\$550,000	\$602,600	(\$52,600)	-8.73%
90	Barrett Astin	\$584,300	\$584,300	\$0	0.00%
91	Jacob May	\$525,000	\$575,400	(\$50,400)	-8.76%
92	Brandon Dixon	\$566,500	\$566,500	\$0	0.00%
93	Mike Mayers	\$510,000	\$557,900	(\$47,900)	-8.59%
94	Jeffrey Thompson	\$549,400	\$549,400	\$0	0.00%
99	David Ledbetter	\$350,000	\$520,600	(\$170,600)	-32.77%
100	Ryon Healy	\$500,000	\$525,600	(\$25,600)	-4.87%
101	Chase Johnson	\$440,000	\$510,600	(\$70,600)	-13.83%
103	Michael O'Neill	\$500,900	\$500,900	\$0	0.00%
107	Conrad Gregor	\$481,900	\$481,900	\$0	0.00%
108	Tyler Skulina	\$800,000	\$477,300	\$322,700	67.61%
109	Jordan Patterson	\$425,000	\$472,600	(\$47,600)	-10.07%
111	Kyle Crockett	\$463,600	\$463,600	\$0	0.00%
113	Myles Smith	\$400,000	\$454,800	(\$54,800)	-12.05%
114	Zane Evans	\$400,000	\$450,400	(\$50,400)	-11.19%
119	Cody Dickson	\$375,000	\$429,200	(\$54,200)	-12.63%
122	Taylor Williams	\$400,000	\$417,000	(\$17,000)	-4.08%
123	Andrew Mitchell	\$413,000	\$413,000	\$0	0.00%
126	Austin Kubitza	\$401,200	\$401,200	\$0	0.00%
131	Dylan Covey	\$370,000	\$382,300	(\$12,300)	-3.22%
132	Brian Ragira	\$415,000	\$378,600	\$36,400	9.61%
135	Ben Lively	\$350,000	\$367,900	(\$17,900)	-4.87%
137	Tony Kemp	\$250,000	\$360,800	(\$110,800)	-30.71%

138	Trey Masek	\$357,400	\$357,400	\$0	0.00%
140	Aaron Slegers	\$380,000	\$350,500	\$29,500	8.42%
142	Chad Wallach	\$343,900	\$343,900	\$0	0.00%
143	Corey Littrell	\$300,000	\$340,500	(\$40,500)	-11.89%
146	Jared King	\$450,000	\$330,800	\$119,200	36.03%
147	Jack Reinheimer	\$327,600	\$327,600	\$0	0.00%
151	Ben Wetzler	N/A	\$315,200	N/A	N/A
152	Joshua Uhen	\$250,000	\$312,200	(\$62,200)	-19.92%
157	Kyle McGowin	\$270,000	\$297,600	(\$27,600)	-9.27%
158	Johnny Field	\$247,500	\$294,600	(\$47,100)	-15.99%
160	Joe Jackson	\$175,000	\$289,000	(\$114,000)	-39.45%
161	Bobby Wahl	\$500,000	\$286,200	\$213,800	74.70%
162	Dan Slania	\$283,500	\$283,500	\$0	0.00%
166	Austin Voth	\$272,800	\$272,800	\$0	0.00%
168	Scott Frazier	\$267,600	\$267,600	\$0	0.00%
176	Champ Stuart	\$300,000	\$247,700	\$52,300	21.11%
178	Trevor Gott	\$200,000	\$242,900	(\$42,900)	-17.66%
179	Adam Frazier	\$240,600	\$240,600	\$0	0.00%
181	Jason Monda	N/A	\$236,000	N/A	N/A
187	Harrison Cooney	\$222,800	\$222,800	\$0	0.00%
191	Kyle Finnegan	\$200,000	\$214,300	(\$14,300)	-6.67%
192	Nick Vander Tuig	\$218,000	\$212,300	\$5,700	2.68%
193	Steve Janas	\$210,200	\$210,200	\$0	0.00%
195	Zack Weiss	\$180,000	\$206,200	(\$26,200)	-12.71%
197	James Ramsay	\$175,000	\$202,300	(\$27,300)	-13.49%
198	David Garner	\$175,000	\$200,400	(\$25,400)	-12.67%
199	Konner Wade	\$198,500	\$198,500	\$0	0.00%
200	Brian Gilbert	\$120,000	\$196,600	(\$76,600)	-38.96%
206	Matthew Oberste	\$325,000	\$185,700	\$139,300	75.01%
209	Buddy Borden	\$180,400	\$180,400	\$0	0.00%
210	Daniel Gibson	\$178,600	\$178,600	\$0	0.00%
214	Brandon Trinkwon	\$171,000	\$171,900	(\$900)	-0.52%
218	Ty Young	\$162,900	\$165,400	(\$2,500)	-1.51%
219	Drew Dosch	\$218,500	\$163,800	\$54,700	33.39%
222	Brandon Bednar	\$161,500	\$161,500	\$0	0.00%
224	Nick Rumbelow	\$100,000	\$160,800	(\$60,800)	-37.81%
226	Jimmy Yezzo	\$160,100	\$160,100	\$0	0.00%
230	Dustin DeMuth	N/A	\$158,600	N/A	N/A
236	Ricky Knapp	\$130,000	\$156,500	(\$26,500)	-16.93%
249	Trey Mancini	\$151,900	\$151,900	\$0	0.00%

251	Tyler Marincov	\$100,000	\$151,300	(\$51,300)	-33.91%
253	Kyle Wren	\$150,500	\$150,500	\$0	0.00%
257	Brian Holberton	\$150,000	\$149,200	\$800	0.54%
259	Patrick Valaika	\$148,500	\$148,500	\$0	0.00%
269	Chad Kuhl	\$145,000	\$145,200	(\$200)	-0.14%
272	Tyler Linehan	\$125,000	\$144,100	(\$19,100)	-13.25%
277	Stephen McGee	\$60,000	\$142,500	(\$82,500)	-57.89%
279	Mitch Horacek	\$100,000	\$141,900	(\$41,900)	-29.53%
282	Donald Snelten	\$140,900	\$140,900	\$0	0.00%
284	Conner Kendrick	\$115,000	\$140,200	(\$25,200)	-17.97%
290	Charles Irby	\$138,400	\$138,400	\$0	0.00%
291	Ross Kivett	N/A	\$138,100	N/A	N/A
299	Shane Carle	\$100,000	\$135,600	(\$35,600)	-26.25%
300	Jimmie Sherfy	\$100,000	\$135,300	(\$35,300)	-26.09%
304	Nick Keener	\$5,000	\$135,300	(\$130,300)	-96.30%
306	Kasey Coffman	\$135,300	\$135,300	\$0	0.00%

APPENDIX C: HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS (2013 MLB DRAFT ROUNDS 1-10)

Pick	Player	Signed	Slot	+/-	Percent
4	Kohl Stewart	\$4,544,400	\$4,544,400	\$0	0.00%
5	Clint Frazier	\$3,500,000	\$3,787,000	(\$287,000)	-7.58%
7	Trey Ball	\$2,750,000	\$3,246,500	(\$496,500)	-15.29%
9	Austin Meadows	\$3,029,600	\$3,029,600	\$0	0.00%
10	Phil Bickford	N/A	\$2,921,400	N/A	N/A
11	Dominic Smith	\$2,600,000	\$2,840,300	(\$240,300)	-8.46%
14	Reese McGuire	\$2,369,800	\$2,569,800	(\$200,000)	-7.78%
16	J.P. Crawford	\$2,299,300	\$2,299,300	\$0	0.00%
17	Tim Anderson	\$2,164,000	\$2,164,000	\$0	0.00%
21	Nick Ciuffo	\$1,974,700	\$1,974,700	\$0	0.00%
22	Hunter Harvey	\$1,947,700	\$1,947,700	\$0	0.00%
24	Billy McKinney	\$1,800,000	\$1,893,500	(\$93,500)	-4.94%
25	Christian Arroyo	\$1,866,500	\$1,866,500	\$0	0.00%
28	Rob Kaminsky	\$1,785,300	\$1,785,300	\$0	0.00%
30	Travis Demeritte	\$1,900,000	\$1,731,200	\$168,800	9.75%
33	Ian Clarkin	\$1,650,100	\$1,650,100	\$0	0.00%
35	Matt Krook	N/A	\$1,587,700	N/A	N/A
37	Josh Hart	\$1,450,000	\$1,508,600	(\$58,600)	-3.88%
42	Ryan McMahan	\$1,327,600	\$1,327,600	\$0	0.00%
47	Clinton Hollon	\$467,300	\$1,168,200	(\$700,900)	-60.00%
48	Andrew Church	\$850,000	\$1,138,800	(\$288,800)	-25.36%

50	Dustin Peterson	\$1,400,000	\$1,082,000	\$318,000	29.39%
51	Blake Taylor	\$750,000	\$1,065,400	(\$315,400)	-29.60%
52	Justin Williams	\$1,050,000	\$1,049,200	\$800	0.08%
54	Devin Williams	\$1,350,000	\$1,017,300	\$332,700	32.70%
55	Tyler Danish	\$1,001,800	\$1,001,800	\$0	0.00%
57	Oscar Mercado	\$1,500,000	\$971,400	\$528,600	54.42%
59	Hunter Green	\$942,000	\$942,000	\$0	0.00%
60	Riley Unroe	\$997,500	\$927,500	\$70,000	7.55%
61	Chance Sisco	\$785,000	\$913,300	(\$128,300)	-14.05%
62	Akeem Bostick	\$520,600	\$899,400	(\$378,800)	-42.12%
64	Rider Jones	\$880,000	\$872,100	\$7,900	0.91%
66	Gosuke Kotah	\$845,700	\$845,700	\$0	0.00%
67	Kevin Franklin	\$675,000	\$832,700	(\$157,700)	-18.94%
69	Jordan Paroubeck	\$650,000	\$807,500	(\$157,500)	-19.50%
72	Tucker Neuhaus	\$771,000	\$771,000	\$0	0.00%
76	Ivan Wilson	\$624,900	\$724,900	(\$100,000)	-13.80%
81	Jonathan Denney	\$875,000	\$671,200	\$203,800	30.36%
82	Carter Hope	\$560,900	\$660,900	(\$100,000)	-15.13%
83	Patrick Murphy	\$500,000	\$650,800	(\$150,800)	-23.17%
84	Casey Meisner	\$500,000	\$640,900	(\$140,900)	-21.98%
85	Tyler O'Neill	\$650,000	\$631,100	\$18,900	2.99%
89	Cord Sandberg	\$775,000	\$593,400	\$181,600	30.60%
96	Jan Hernandez	\$550,000	\$535,800	\$14,200	2.65%
97	Thomas Milone	\$528,100	\$530,600	(\$2,500)	-0.47%
102	Carlos Salazar	\$625,000	\$505,700	\$119,300	23.59%
104	Mark Armstrong	\$496,000	\$496,000	\$0	0.00%
105	Drew Ward	\$850,000	\$491,200	\$358,800	73.05%
106	Chris Kohler	\$486,600	\$486,600	\$0	0.00%
110	Stephen Gonzalves	\$700,000	\$468,200	\$231,800	49.51%
112	K.J. Woods	\$459,200	\$459,200	\$0	0.00%
115	Evan Smith	\$350,000	\$446,100	(\$96,100)	-21.54%
118	Mason Smith	\$415,000	\$433,300	(\$18,300)	-4.22%
120	Matt McPhearson	\$500,000	\$425,100	\$74,900	17.62%
121	Jake Sweaney	\$400,000	\$421,000	(\$21,000)	-4.99%
124	Cody Bellinger	\$700,000	\$409,000	\$291,000	71.15%
128	Kean Wong	\$391,000	\$393,500	(\$2,500)	-0.64%
129	Jonah Heim	\$389,700	\$389,700	\$0	0.00%
133	Tanner Murphy	\$250,000	\$375,000	(\$125,000)	-33.33%
134	Tyler Wade	\$371,300	\$371,300	\$0	0.00%
141	Sean Brady	\$800,000	\$347,100	\$452,900	130.48%

144	Amalani Fukofuka	\$175,000	\$337,300	(\$162,300)	-48.12%
148	Josh Van Meter	\$308,000	\$324,500	(\$16,500)	-5.08%
149	Trae Arbet	\$425,000	\$321,400	\$103,600	32.23%
150	Jamie Westbrook	\$450,000	\$318,300	\$131,700	41.38%
153	Thaddius Lowry	\$400,000	\$309,200	\$90,800	29.37%
155	Ian McKinney	\$227,100	\$303,300	(\$76,200)	-25.12%
159	Travis Seabrooke	\$291,800	\$291,800	\$0	0.00%
165	Cory Thompson	\$367,900	\$275,400	\$92,500	33.59%
167	Jacob Nottingham	\$300,000	\$270,200	\$29,800	11.03%
169	Dominic Nunez	\$800,000	\$265,000	\$535,000	201.89%
170	Brian Navarroto	\$262,500	\$262,500	\$0	0.00%
171	Casey Shane	\$150,000	\$259,900	(\$109,900)	-42.29%
173	Jordan Austin	\$254,900	\$254,900	\$0	0.00%
177	Corey Simpson	\$400,000	\$245,300	\$154,700	63.07%
188	Stephen Woods	N/A	\$220,600	N/A	N/A
189	Alex Murphy	\$275,000	\$218,500	\$56,500	25.86%
205	Conner Greene	\$100,000	\$187,400	(\$87,400)	-46.64%
208	Jake Bauers	\$240,000	\$182,100	\$57,900	31.80%
213	Trey Michalczewski	\$500,000	\$173,600	\$326,400	188.02%
215	Chris Rivera	\$150,000	\$170,300	(\$20,300)	-11.92%
221	Dustin Driver	\$500,000	\$162,000	\$338,000	208.64%
223	Ian Stiffler	\$210,000	\$161,200	\$48,800	30.27%
225	Tyler Mahle	\$250,000	\$160,500	\$89,500	55.76%
227	Jason Martin	\$159,700	\$159,700	\$0	0.00%
229	Terry McClure	\$250,000	\$159,100	\$90,900	57.13%
232	Iramis Olivencia	\$135,000	\$158,000	(\$23,000)	-14.56%
238	Adrian de Horta	\$425,000	\$155,800	\$269,200	172.79%
239	Neil Kozikowski	\$425,000	\$155,400	\$269,600	173.49%
240	Brad Keller	\$125,000	\$155,100	(\$30,100)	-19.41%
242	Brandon Diaz	\$150,000	\$155,400	(\$5,400)	-3.47%
248	Roel Ramirez	\$127,500	\$152,200	(\$24,700)	-16.23%
258	Charcer Burks	\$170,000	\$148,900	\$21,100	14.17%
283	Dylan Manwaring	\$140,600	\$140,600	\$0	0.00%
287	Austin Nicely	\$610,000	\$139,400	\$470,600	337.59%
296	Luis Guillorme	\$200,000	\$136,400	\$63,600	46.63%
305	Malik Collymore	\$275,000	\$135,300	\$139,700	103.25%
313	Ian Hagenmiller	\$200,000	\$135,300	\$64,700	47.82%